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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VENETA JESPERSON, * 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
* 
vs. * No. 16413 
WILLIAM LeROY JESPERSON, SR., 'I< 
Defendant and Appellant. 
* 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 5th 
District Court for Washington County, 
Hon. Robert F. Owens, District Judge Pro Tern 
Palmer and Anderson 
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St. George, Utah 84 770 
Aftorneys for Respondent 
Atkin, Wright & Miles 
P. 0. Box 339 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S oRIEF 
Respondent in her brief on appeal has resorted to 
niskading statements and innuendo rather than presenting an 
arguriitctlt based on factual statements. Even the purported 
"Stalernen t Of Facts" is erroneous and not supported by the 
re co rd. 
An occasional harmless error in the brief can be 
o\'erlooked as simply an innocent mistake. However, when the 
inaccurate statements are material and important to the equit-
able resolution of this property settlement they can only 
have the purpose of misleading the Supreme Court as to the 
true L1cts and the status of the evidence. 
For example, on page 3 of Respondent's "Statement 
Of Facts" the statement is made that "the court distributed 
the proper tv of the marriage 77% to the Plain ti ff and 2 3% 
to the Defendant." This statement is false and misleading 
and the Respondent's counsel either knows it is false or he 
has not read Appellant's brief and cannot tmderstand simple 
arithmetic. The trial court awarded the furniture and auto-
mobile to the Respondent (Tr. P290, LL14-20) and Respondent 
herself valued these items at $2,000.00 and $3,000.00, respec-
tively (Plaintiff's Full Disclosure Financial Declaration, 
page 2). In paragraph 3 of the trial court's FINDINGS Respondent 
was awarded the first $19,027.00 of the $27,000.00 sales price 
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from the sale of the parties St. George home, leaving ab 
1 a anc, 
of $7,973.00 to be distributed. It was only that portion r 
o" 
the $7,973.00 remaining after costs of sale had been deducte
2 
that the trial court awarded 77% to Respondent and 23% to 
Appellant. The costs of sale totaled $1,802.67, leaving only 
$6,170.33 to be distributed 77"/o and 23"/o. Of course, 237. of 
$6,170.33 is only $1,419.18, not $6,945.39 which is 23/.of 
the $30,197.33, which is the total property of the marriage 
(see page 8 of Appellant's brief). Appellant's $1,419.18 
amounts to only 4. 7"/o of the property of the marriage and 
Appellant's share would be even less if we took into accowit 
the savings and certificates of deposit (amounts unknown) tha: 
were also awarded to Respondent (Tr. P290, LL21-25). 
Appellant's counsel is disturbed that Respondent 
would misrepresent the property division actually made by the 
trial court. Pages 3 and 8 of Appellant's brief clearly and 
accurately show that Appellant received only 4. 7% of the 
$30, 197. 33 marital estate, not counting savings and certifica' 
of deposit of uncertain amounts that were also awarded to 
Respondent. Yet Respondent persists throughout her brief in 
claiming that Appellant received 23% of the property. For 
example, page 9 of Respondent's brief states "The trial court 
distributed the property 77"/0 to the Plaintiff-Respondent and 
23% to the Defendant-Appellant." £
. st Then on page 19 the ir 
sentence of Respondent's conclusion states .!.'Plain tiff-Respon· 
respectfully submits that the trial court's award of 777, to 
-2-
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the Plaintiff-Respondent and 23% to the Defendant-Appellant 
of the marital estates was proper and clearly within the 
discretion of the court." This sentence would be somewhat 
truthful if the word "deceitfully" were substituted for the 
word "respectfully". After making that false statement the 
Respondent has the barefaced audacity in the very next sentence 
of the conclusion to suggest that Appellant's brief is based 
on "assumptions" without having pointed out a single assumption 
or unsupportable fact that has been relied upon in Appellant's 
brief. 
On the contrary, Appellant's brief is based upon 
the record and quotes extensively from the transcript, largely 
from Resp on dent's own testimony. The only fact or figure used 
in Appellant's brief that is not in the record is the $1,802.67 
costs of sale of the St. George home. That figure was not 
known at the time of trial but both parties signed a closing 
statement which disclosed the actual amount of the costs of 
." sale to be $1,802.67 and counsel for both parties received a 
copy of that closing statement. In the last paragraph of his 
FINDINGS the trial judge estimated that the costs of sale 
would be $2, 000. 00. Respondent has not disputed the accuracy 
of the $1,802.67 figure and it should therefore stand. Inci-
~ntally, had the costs of sale actually been $2,000.00 the 
Appellant would have received an even smaller property settle-
n' ment, both in dollar amount and percentage of the marital 
estate, making Appellant's share even less than 4. 7%. 
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Respondent's brief relies heavily upon innuendo I 
I 
and half-truths which characterize the Appellant 
as a veri tab'./ 
blackguard living off Respondent as a parasite. The brief 
dwells at length and places unwarranted emphasis upon Appell&:: 
conduct in leaving Respondent several times during the marria[i 
and on Appellant's "gambling habit" in order to justify the 
trial court's lopsided award to Respondent. In a marriage 
"it is seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly guilty 
or wholly innocent party" and that: 
"We recognize that there is no authority in our 
law for administering punitive measures in a divom 
judgment, and that to do so would be improper ... " 
Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) 
Appellant testified that he left Respondent because of her 
sarcastic nature and because of family disagreements that 
occurred on some 10 trips to Alpine, Texas to visit Respondent'; 
family (Tr. Pl58, LLlS-22). Respondent apparently enjoyed 
his companionship or the security his presence provided inasc•: 
as she accepted him back every time except the last. Refer· 
ences to Appellant's gambling in Respondent's brief has been I 
b lawn totally out of proportion. A reading of the transcript 
shows that both of them went to Las Vegas and enjoyed gambling 
It was nothing more than a recreational activity for them. 
It is apparent that the trial court, as has counsel in his 
' usation> brief, been excessively influenced by Respondent s ace 
and recriminations against Appellant. 
Respondent would have the court s:nd Appellant 011 : 
of the marriage with an old suitcase and a few old clot~les 
-4-
rd 
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and asl<s the court to ignor the substantial value of Appellant's 
work on three different homes. Respondent claims that by so 
doing Appellant would be no worse off than he was prior to 
the marriage. This is not true because Appellant is now six 
years older and he could have been gainfully employed during 
the years he spent fixing up their three homes. Further, 
Respondent's argument ignors the real question that must be 
answered in divorce property settlements. That question is-
"How can the property be divided to enable both parties to 
continue their lives in a happy and useful manner." This has 
been the consistent theme of nearly all Supreme Court decisions 
on property settlement questions for the last 20 years or more. 
How could the Appellant possibly pursue his life in 
a happy and useful manner 1.IDder the judgment of the trial 
court? By taking his old suitcase held together with a rope 
and joining the hobo circuit?: Meanwhile, Respondent takes 
all the property to Alpine, Texas to live near her daughter 
who owns a shopping center. How can the Appellant be "main-
tained" as required by Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, in the situation in which he has been placed 
by the trial court? The court in Martinett v. Martinett 8 
Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958) made a pertinent statement 
in regard to this statute on page 823 when it said: 
"It is important to note that this statute makes 
no distinction between the spouses. It does not 
contemplate, nor should there be,-.any d~scrimination 
or inequality in such awards on the basis of sex. 
-5-
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They may be made in favor of either spouse a d 
should be based upon the needs of the partiesn d 
the equities of the situation being dealt with a~ 
Perhaps Appellant should be awarded alimony to help meet his 
needs for future maintenance. At the very least an adjustment 
of the completely lopsided property settlement is in order. 
Respondent's brief apparently attempts to mislead 
the Supreme Court by making several references as to how 
the trial court applied the rules of law found in the case 
of Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, Utah, (1979). Respondent's 
brief states, on page 9, that "In light of all the facts the 
trial court clearly followed the guidance provided in the 
recent case of Read v. Read " and on page 10 that "It 
would appear that the trial court was very cautious to proper:: 
apply the rule of Read v. Read Supra." The trial judge in 
the Read case was the same judge who heard this case. The 
FINDINGS in this case were made March 2, 19 79 while the Supre" 
Court decision in the Read case was not filed until April 4, 
1979, a month later. Therefore, it would have been impossible 
for the trial judge to have considered the Supreme Court's 
opinion in the Read case as the Respondent's brief implies. 
The trial judge's findings in this case are ample evidence 
that he was again punishing the party he found "was guilty 
of gross and repeated marital misconduct" by awarding nearly 
11 h h R d t The tr)._. al J. udge apparent! a t e property to t e espon en . 
made these findings without knowledge that l,lis decision in 
Read had been remanded for modifications. 
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Respondent's brief also misleads the court when it 
states on page 6 that Respondent's separate property was needed 
to pay for the improvements made to the three homes and is 
again misleading when it states on page 13 that Respondent 
funded all improvements to the homes. Appellant's brief shows, 
on pages 14 to 17, that Respondent's claims are unsupported 
by the record. The parties received more than enough money 
from the sales of their homes to recover the original cost and 
to pay for al 1 the improvements. In fact, there was enough 
money to reimburse Appellant for the value of his labor ($4,970.00) 
with an overall profit of $1,819.23 still remaining. Thus, the 
parties were able to meet their ordinary living expenses with 
their joint social security incomes. The improvements made 
on the Roswell and St. George homes were paid for through 
joint checking accounts to which both parties deposited their 
monthly income (Tr. PP127-128, Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13, and Tr. 
Pl86, LL7-13). The accounting below proves from the record 
that the parties received enough money from the sales of their 
three homes to recover the original cost of each, to pay for 
all improvements, and to pay Appellant for the reasonable 
value of his labor with a profit of $1,819.23 remaining. 
Sales Price-Ruidoso (Tr. P92, Ll5) 
Sales Price-Roswell (Exhibit 5) 
Sales Price-St. George (Tr. Pl09, L22) 
Total Received 
-7-
-. 
$24,500.00 
25,000.00 
2 7 I 000. 00 
$76,500.00 
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Less: Closing Costs 
Ruidoso (Tr. P155, LL6-ll) 
Roswell (Exhibit 5) 
$ NONE 
1,894.11 
! 
I 
I 
St. George 
Net Proceeds Received 
1,802.67 ~, 
$72 ,803.11 
Less: Original Costs 
Ruidoso (Tr. P38, LL4-9) 
Roswell (Tr. P47, LL24-25) 
St. George (Tr. PlOl, L24) 
Remaining for Improvements 
Less: Improvements 
Ruidoso (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25) 
Roswell (Tr. PP49-50) 
St. George (Tr. P53) 
Add back Refrigerator Respondent 
still has (Tr. P261, L23) 
Remaining for Appellant's Labor 
Less: Appellant's Labor 
Ruidoso (Tr. PP169-174) 
Roswell (Tr. PP176-180) 
St. George (FINDINGS of trial 
court) 
Overall Profit On Three Homes 
$17,500.00 
17,500.00 
19,027.50 54,02).jG 
$18,775.n 
$ 1,050.00 
4' 870 .10 
6,958.39 
(892.00) 11, 986 .4) 
$ 6,789.1) 
$ 2,120.00 
750.00 
2,100.00 4,97U 
$ 1, 819 .1J 
:::::=========: 
Even if it is assumed that all improvements were 
paid from Respondent's separate funds (an assumption, incl· 
dentally that would be contrary to the evidence at trial) 
and that she should be reimbursed for them, there would still 
be enough to pay Appellant the $4,970.00 for his six years 
of work, leaving the profit of $1,819.23 to be divided. 
That Appellant's work increased the value of their homes c~1 · 
. . "" . f he fact 
not be denied (Tr. P85, Lll), especially in view o t 
that two of the homes were mobile homes which ordinarilY 
-8-
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decline in value rather than appreciate. Respondent's brief 
on par,e 14 implies that Appellant, through his improvements 
to their homes, did not provide any specialized skills despite 
the fact that Appellant had been a contractor (Tr. P201, LLll-22) 
because of Appellant's age and retired status. To deny that 
Appellant has made contributions simply because he has been 
retired for a few years is patently absurd. It is well known 
that senior citizens can and do make significant contributions 
in nearly every field of endeavor. 
All of this is to say that Respondent has attempted 
to reconstruct the record in self-serving ways to attempt to 
cloud the fact that the award of the trial court was indeed 
inequitable and unreasonable. Whether Respondent likes it 
or not, the record and the record only, can be used to evaluate 
the case, not what one would like to have had the record show'. 
Respondent argues that Appellant has the burden to 
show an abuse of discretion and cites a few cases stating 
that the trial court has wide discretion. This, of course, 
is true - the trial court has wide discretion - but one might 
ask, how else can one show an abuse of that discretion other 
than to show that the distribution was not in the general 
range of 1/ 3 to the wife and 2/ 3 to the husband as is often 
the case, or that it was not one-half to each which is some-
times done, but that the award of the trial court was 95. 3% 
to Respondent and only 4. 7% to Appellant'. 411.at award was made 
-9-
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in the face of evidence that Appellant wa': living with a 
widowed daughter in an apartment while Respondent w 1 as i ving 
in her own home near her daughter who owns a large shopping 
center (Page 5 of Appellant's brief). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant in his brief has shown that the trial 
court's findings were not, in fact, supported by the evidence f 
Although the trial court recognized the value of Appellant's 
work on the last home the re is no exp lana ti on why the trial 
court ignored the value of Appellant's work on the first two 
homes. 
The Appellant's brief shows on page 18 that, as a 
bare minimum, Appellant is entitled to an award of $5 ,879.61. 
The Supreme Court, however, should not ignor the actual con· 
duct of the parties through the eight transactions listed on 
pages 22 and 23 of Appellant's brief, all of which are well 
documented by the evidence produced at trial and which demon· 
strate that Respondent made a gift to Appellant, which was 
reaffirmed several times, of one-half their real property. 
This court should not allow Respondent to revoke her gift 
through this divorce. 
h t belo1 In any event, however, the award oft e cour 
should be modified to reflect justice and equity and not 
serve as a vehicle to punish Appellant for -the breakup of 
-10-
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their marriage as was obviously the only explicable reason 
for the award that was made by the court below. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that even though 
trial courts are given wide latitude, this is a case in which 
this court should exercise its supervisory function to pre-
vent the imposition of a grave injustice and a serious abuse 
of discretion against the Appellant. 
DATED this f'. rll day of November, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES 
By ./bJ/, ,;?( ///I£""= 
JOlili L. Miles 
Attorney for the Appellant 
-. 
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